Too big for Europe, too small for the rest of the world

The Germany that rises anew over the two post-reunion decades has demonstrated more capability to face major European challenges than most Member States. On her second term, in a coalition with the FDP liberals, dealing with a stalemate in treaty negotiations, an international financial crisis, sovereign debt in Europe, the Ireland, Greece and Portugal bailouts, and the imminent collapse of the single currency, Angela Merkel stepped up as a leader on all those fronts. Not so much to mint herself the new European Tsar — though she does feature a portrait of Catherine the Great in her office — but to safeguard the Euro as a guarantee for that monopolar German moment. If the single currency was one of the means of growth in Germany, there is no reason to end the experiment. Even if it means driving down standards of living for many European states under financial assistance.  

In other words, it's not so much the German Chancellor defining an articulated plan for Europe as it is this ascending Germany (hand in glove with the Constitutional Court's political centrality) that conditions Merkel's decisions.  Governing nuance aside, another chancellor would have first seen to German interest than that of other European nations. This is not to absolve Ms. Merkel of her errors, exaggerations, stubbornness, mistakes, obsessions and the damage she's caused throughout this endless European crisis — no, merely a line of thinking that intends to highlight another impassable political front (German voters, Teutonic institutions and the historical moment in Germany) and less of a personal, isolated reading of German's internal context. The learning that arose from those errors was experienced during the management of the pandemic crisis. 

Coalitions recur in post-war German history. Only once after WWII was there a one-party majority in parliament (CDU, from 1957 through 1961), and even then Adenauer's party had to run, as usual, with the Bavarian CSU in a pre-election coalition.  Going back to Merkel, since 2005 she spent 12 out of 16 years governing through a "major coalition”, which is to say, with the SPD. Before that, Schroeder's reforms, which healed the "European Patient”, as the Economist called it, had been supported by the CDU. In 2005, the two parties made the union official and, from 2009 onward, even outside of government, the SPD further supported Ms. Merkel's policies than did FDP, with which the chancellor entered into a coalition for four years.  

Pragmatism has been another ingredient in Merkel's European policy. It helps that she ironed out the kinks in the relationship with Paris when the time was right, especially over the past two years with President Macron, engaging a wider swath of Member States, and that she enjoys a close relationship with the current president of the European Commission. But such leaderships happen because forces within the great German coalition have aligned in a different way. The SPD team in Finance has relinquished some tenets of its financial orthodoxy regarding the EU. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chancellor have indicated they see German interest coalescing with European interests. The economy may now rely on a heavyweight like the CDU that can support outsized community plans for rapid recovery in the common market, and the health sector is led by an ambitious CDU politician who, propelled by the sector’s financial surplus, has tried to steer clear from the path of error and avoided creating entropy in the coalition. At the top, President Steinmeier has contributed quality and sensibility, investing this delicate European moment with the historic tone demanded of decision-makers and content befitting the solutions required. It is this social-democrat consensus which many would call milquetoast centrism, of which Merkel is the hub. Starting with the refugee crisis in 2015, she's been sustaining Germany and contributing to a European reaction one would deem rather more constructive than the response to the prior financial crisis. 

In 2005, Angela Merkel became the first woman elected to the German Chancellorship and the first head of government from East Germany, as well as the youngest. In 2021, the novelty factor doesn't have such a clear protagonist. Rather, it has congregated around the lightning rise of the Green Party which, over the past few years, have become the number two party in German polls, and even number one at times. Elbowing their way into the CDU/SPD duopoly, they have shaken German politics to the core, but this also carries strong transformative potential to their European strategy and even their relationship with the world's superpowers.  

Few may now recall that the current German cabinet took six months to begin working in an official capacity when the September 2017 parliamentary election gave Merkel her fourth consecutive victory. Few may now remember, but the Green Party was the first to agree to negotiations with CDU in order to form a coalition, but such a coalition did not come to pass. These two facts tell us that, on the one hand, it may be good to prepare for a hiatus after the next election, taking into account the balanced outcomes suggested by polls, which were not so four years ago; on the other hand, that the Greens do not only have a honed sense of practicality but also that, these days, such practicality makes them more competitive in the quest for political power.  

It wouldn't be redundant to state that European politics experienced changes in 2020. Despite the pandemic, though maybe also because of it, investment in climate transition remained steadfast. Despite the pandemic, though maybe also because of it, priority given to digital transformation dictated the pace of economic reform and of the recovery plans that have been set in motion. Indeed, a part of the funds made available, regardless of scheme or schedule, is intended for expansion of environment-friendly infrastructures — in mobility, power generation or housing, you name it. Much on account of the pandemic, Europeans agreed on a joint debt issue mechanism that wouldn't have gone forward without the current crisis. That would have seemed unimaginable. We can also add that the debate on new instruments and powers for the EU gained traction over the past year, be it in public health, the tax domain, its strategic autonomy, climate ambitions, or the role the CEB must play. In truth, if we add openness to refugees, we can conclude that all those dynamics are near and dear to the Greens’ agenda. They're the most pro-European faction in the Bundestag, which not only validates the pertinence of their positions, as far as voters are concerned, but also pushes their authentic acuity to the front lines of European politics. I would dare say Angela Merkel unwillingly became the political godmother and patron to the growth of the Green Party.  

They’ve benefited from such patronage on the European plane through the dynamics I described above, and gained non-negotiable counterpoints against China or Russia, especially when they opposed Nord Stream 2. If the party proves able to explore an alternative path that will secure allies in Europe and mostly in Washington, that will lead to deep change in European politics. Over in Germany, the double disappointment served up by Merkel's chosen successors, Annegret Kramp-Karrembauer e Armin Laschet, and the latter's difficulties in mobilizing forces, along with the cacophonous management of the pandemic over the past months, added to instances of corruption in parliament, have facilitated the rise of the Greens as obvious sanctuary to centre-left voters weary of the SPD and centre-right voters orphaned by Merkel.  Annalena Baerbock being put forward as prospective chancellor may prove smart. She could give the Greens a powerful boost leading to consolidation of a large social-democrat basis up until the election — a vote for the novel, though novel doesn't mean flash in the pan; for an agenda that time has validate, and pragmatism that does not become malleable; for a cosmopolitan programme that does not neglect rural issues; with the world in its sights, but a local perspective as well; plus the power of a new generation added to competence.